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The Sound of Silence: equilibrium ltering and optimal
censoring in nancial markets
by
Miles B. Gietzmann and Adam J. Ostaszewski
Abstract. Following the approach of standard ltering theory, we analyse
investor-valuation of rms, when these are modelled as geometric-Brownian
state processes that are privately and partially observed, at random (Pois-
son) times, by agents. Tasked with disclosing forecast values, agents are able
purposefully to withhold their observations; explicit ltering formulas are
derived for downgrading the valuations in the absence of disclosures. The
analysis is conducted for both a solitary rm and m co-dependent rms.
Key word: disclosure, ltering, public ltration, predictable valuation,
optimal censor, asset-price dynamics.
AMSClassication: 91G50, 91G80; 93E11, 93E35; 60G35, 60G25.
1 Introduction
Motivated by applications from nancial mathematics, we assume below that
the ow of information reaching a market is inuenced strategically by the
agents responsible for making and subsequently disclosing observations, sim-
ply because observations made by a self-interested agent can be suppressed.
For instance, suppose the agents self-interest manifests itself as wanting only
to report good news, and so to suppress bad news. If the cuto¤ that denes
whether an observation is good or bad news is dened relative to prior ex-
pectations, then the agent will disclose only observations above the prior.
A model of strategic reporting needs specically to incorporate how poten-
tial recipients of disclosed observations (investors) can rationally respond to
silence from the agent, when absence of observation cannot credibly be indi-
cated by the agent, and disclosure is not mandatory. We assume below that
at Poisson arrival times the agent is able to observe information, and has
then the option to disclose the observed information, but only truthfully, or
to suppress it (i.e. hide the badnews). Then the question arises: what is the
optimal level of suppression. We answer below in Theorem 1 and Theorem
1m with explicit formulas in a multi-agent multi-period context. We work in
a continuous Black-Scholes framework introducing the novel concept of an
optimal censor (§2.2). This combines censoring with ltering (for which see
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[1], [2], [11], [24]). It is the key here. In particular we derive closed-form
exponential decay solutions for the optimal time-varying censor in periods of
silence; a new insight here is that penalization of silence is harshest at the be-
ginning (see §3.2 Corollary for details). These are the pleasing consequences
of moving to continuous time: simplication of the natural equilibrium con-
ditions (e.g. (1) in §2.3 and in §3.1.1; cf. (10)) to a rst-order di¤erential
equation (see (6) in §3.1); a transparent narrative at the single agent level;
a rich joint asset-price dynamic, via the repercussions on each other, of a
stream of disclosures from the multiplicity of correlated agents. This paper
is a sequel to our previous work, where such questions were pursued in a
discrete two-period setting (in [27] and [16] for the case of one rm, and in
[15] where further reality is added via a communication game with multiple
competitors in an industry correlated by common operating conditions). We
were motivated by the static-setting literature of costly state verication (e.g.
by Townsend [30] in 1979 see the later literature in [20]), and of corporate
disclosure introduced by Dye [13] in 1985 (and the associated paper [19]).
The additional results in §4 highlight consequences of our main theorems
in [15] for the bandwagon and quality e¤ects in the current setting. These
qualitative results extend our ndings in the two-period model of [15]. For
instance: when competing managers are endowed with di¤erent observation
noise, those managers that observe with most noise use a lower censor and
hence suppress bad news less. But then this means that, when investors
see slightly-below-mean observations being disclosed by such managers, they
rationally interpret this as being from a more noisy source, and so discount
its importance when updating.
A broadly similar class of models arises in the engineering literature study-
ing alternation between observation (measurement) and control, typically
in a discrete-time setting, but there the alternation is the result of a trade-o¤
between the two actions, dictated by a single indicator of overall performance
of a system (i.e. a suitable objective function); a related class considers in-
termittent receipt of measurements/observations, but there the suppression
is caused by random transmission failures see e.g. [7], [18], [29].
In discrete time, Shin [28] introduced (in 2004) a model of a rm, en-
gaged in a ow of projects, receiving information with a Poisson distribution
concerning the status (success or failure) of projects completed to date. By
endowing the rm with the opportunity at each date of a full or partial dis-
closure of that information, he created an asset-pricing framework in which
such disclosures are endogenously determined, and so could study equilibrium
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patterns of corporate disclosure.
In continuous time, Brody, Hughston and Macrina [6] introduced (in
2007) an asset-pricing framework based on noisy market-observation of con-
tinuous information that is generated from the remaining future disclosures,
occuring at pre-determined (mandatory) dates. Similarly to Shin, their
disclosures are modelled as a discrete series of random variables; the latter
give rise to a stream of uncertain payouts (cash ows) corresponding to the
mandatory dates. The individual cash values are taken to be deterministic
functions of independent random variables called market-factors(not un-
like our terminal-time output variable Z1), but with the inclusion only of
those that are capable of being observed by the modeller at and prior to
the date of disclosure. Typically the markets noisy observation is a linear
combination of the future payouts, each weighted by a coe¢ cient that gains
increasing prominence over time, and Brownian-bridge components, which
vanish at the corresponding payout-dates. However, in contrast to Shin,
all the dividend-disclosures are mandatory and the possibility of voluntary
intermittent disclosures (say via a zero dividend) is not studied.
In a recent development, Marinovic and Varas [25] (in 2014) consider a
voluntary disclosure model in continuous time, in which a single agent unin-
terruptedly observes an asset following a f0; 1g-valued random walk. (The
binary aspect leads to market-price decay, which like ours is exponential.)
In creating a multi-asset Black-Scholes asset-pricing framework in which
corporate disclosures are endogenously determined, our work is closest in
spirit to Shin [28]. It is also closer in spirit with some of the earlier literature
of portfolio/consumption analysis under incomplete information, e.g. Feld-
mans model of 1992 ([14]; cf. literature cited there) of a production exchange
economy, where realized outputs are observed (whereas in the model below a
noisy version of the output process Zt is observed), and provide via a nonlin-
ear lter an information ow on the underlying economic state process (a pro-
ductivityfactor, following an OrnsteinUhlenbeck mean-reverting process).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In §2, abstracting away
from the market motivation, we exploit in §2.1 some of the ideas of standard
ltering theory to describe scalar observations by m individuals (agents)
that are made intermittently in the interval (0; 1) privately (i.e. in secret),
and either kept secret or disclosed (reported) to the other agents and in-
vestors. The observation processes have a co-dependance, as do also cer-
tain other scalar processes which assign a valuation to each agent. This
co-dependance is determined by a single state-process called the common
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e¤ect. The shared information, together with the initial mandatory obser-
vation values of time t = 0; provides the basis upon which to forecast each
individuals valuation at the terminal time t = 1 of the next mandatory
disclosure.
Agents disclose their observations in order to enhance at each moment
the forecast of their terminal valuation, which is contingent on the manda-
tory disclosures at the terminal time. This leads to an optimization problem
stated in §2.2. If each agent discloses only observations above their censoring
threshold, keeping secret lower observed values, silence at any date in (0; 1)
can mean either the absence of observation, or its censoring (since the arrival
of an undisclosed observation remains secret, and the agent is not able to
assert credibly the absence of a current observation). Since periods of silence
bring precautionary valuation downgrades, the threshold drops over time,
pari passu, to elicit a disclosure; additional tensions arise from potential dis-
closures from other agents, so subgame perfect Nash equilibria considerations
enter the argument see §3.
Section 2.3 interprets the individual valuation as the market value of the
rm obtained from information disclosed to the market by managers making
discretionary (i.e. non-mandatory) disclosures in between the two mandatory
disclosure times of t = 0 and t = 1:
Our two main results are stated and discussed in §3 and proved in §5.2,
§5.3. In §4 the interpretation of §2.3 is used to describe, as immediate
corollaries of earlier work, qualitative features of a multi-agent correlated
sector.
We focus on valuations inferred from periods of silence hence the title.
2 Model
We rst formalize the disclosure framework in a series of steps.
2.1 Processes and ltrations
We x a stochastic basis (
;F ;F;Q), with F := fFt : t 2 [0; 1]g.
2.1.1. State process setup. The production of m  1 scalar processes
from one (vector) process, and the uncertainties connected with this, will be
modelled in terms of the xed (F-Q)-Wiener processWt = (W 0t ;W 1t ; :::;Wmt ),
more precisely in terms of exponential martingales X and M i dened from
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the independent component processes of W; employing correspondingly the
entries of the real vector  = (X0 ; 
M
1 ; : : : ; 
M
m )  0 as follows1:
dXt=Xt = 
X
0 dW
0
t ; t 2 [0; 1] ;
dM it=Mt = 
M
i dW
i
t ; t 2 [0; 1] ;
for every i 2 I := f1; : : : ;mg; here we assume as known the respective
distributions at time-0 of these processes.
The process X has the dual roles of (economic) state process and signal
process, and is regarded as representing a common e¤ect that inuences the
individual internal histories via two processes as follows.
2.1.2 Ouput process. The output process Zt = (Z1t ; :::; Z
m
t ), whose termi-
nal state at time t = 1 is to be forecast, encodes the production of m signals
from the state process as its single input; taking values in Rm, it is dened
componentwise by a weighted power-law:
Zit = 
i(Xt); where 
i(x) = f ixi ;
for i in f1; : : : ;mg; here f i is the size constant of the i-th output and i is
termed the i-th loading exponent (loading factor), both positive, yielding the
terminal output vector Z1. The exponent, which measures the exposure of a
rm to common e¤ects, enables empirical interpretation but is mathemati-
cally of little consequence (as though it had the value 1). To add a technical
remark, it will be convenient in the proofs to rescale such a process to have
size unity at some date, contingent on the available information, a procedure
we call common-sizing.
2.1.3 Internal history process. The internal history process Yt = (Y 1t ; : : : ; Y
m
t )
provides the source of intermittent noisy observations (which are to be selec-
tively disclosed) of the output process Zt; as this is to be a partially observable
process, the construction uses the martingaleM = (M1; : : : ;Mm) as a linear
noise to modify the output process:
Yt = ZtMt;
that is, componentwise: Y it = Z
i
tM
i
t = f
iXit M
i
t :
1Our choice of working with exponential martingales, indeed with Doléans-Dade expo-
nentials, is natural in a setting where a critical equation involves equity values rather than
returns: see Prop. 1 below and especially the equity valuation equation (3), as well as the
interplay of the key equations: (7), (8) [equivalently, (9)], and likewise (10).
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2.1.4 Regression parameters. We collect regression parameters associated
with the processes dened so far. Put i := Mi =i, and dene the associated
precisions
pi := 1=
2
i and p = pagg := p0 + p1 + :::+ pm;
for convenience, we use dual notation for the regression coe¢ cients (relative
precisions):
i or im := pi=p and 
i
1 = pi=(p0 + pi) for m = 1 with i the solitary rm.
2.1.5 Private observation process and private ltration. The observation
of the economic realities embodied in the processes X, Y , and Z is mod-
elled as an intermittent partial observation arising for an individual economic
agent with label in f1; : : : ;mg, and expressed as a private observation process
Y i-obs. The constructions of these concepts below starts from a (càdlàg) Pois-
son process Nt = (N1t ; :::; N
m
t ) which is independent of the Wiener processes
Wt of §2.2.1 and whose vector of intensity functions t = (
1
t ; : : : ; 
m
t ) is in-
homogeneous and also known. The arrival times in (0; 1) of each component
process N i are regarded as consecutively numbered, with i-obsn denoting the
n-th of these; that is, on setting i-obs0 = 0;
i-obsn := infft > i-obsn 1 : N i(t) > N i(t )g:
The intended meaning of this is that the i-th agent observes the process Y i-obs
privately, and only at these arrival time in (0; 1); the last observation time
at or prior to t and the corresponding last observed value are
i-obs  (t) = maxfs  t : N i(s) > N i(s )g;
Y i-obs(t) = Y i(i-obs  (t)):
The resulting process Y i-obs is the private observation process of agent i. It is
piecewise constant, and denes the private ltration of the i-th agent. This
is the (time indexed) family Yprivi of -algebras generated by the jumps at
or before time t, and by the observations at or before time t; here regarded
as space-time point-processes (i.e. with their dates for background see [9,
esp. II Ch. 15] ); it is formally given by
Yprivi := fY it : t 2 [0; 1]g; where Y it := (f(s; Y i-obs(s); N i(s)) : 0 < s  tg) ;
for t 2 (0; 1); where we let Y i0 contain all the null sets of F .
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2.1.6 Public ltration. The public ltrations Gpub, to be constructed next,
formalize the notion of information disclosed via the publicly observed his-
tory of Y . Their construction begins with a xed marked point-process2
(MPP) comprising the following list of items (i) to (iv).
(i) The underlying càdlàg counting processNpubt (the disclosure time process),
(ii) The functions pub , where 
pub
  (t) is the last arrival time of N
pub
t less than
or equal to t, and pub+ (t) is the rst arrival time of N
pub
t bigger than or equal
to t, these relations holding almost surely on Ft, for every t in [0; 1].
(iii) The point process Jt  I := f1; : : : ;mg (the disclosing agent set of time
t).
(iv) The marks Y j-pubt = Y
j-obs(pub  (t)) for j 2 Jt (their corresponding
observations of time t).
In terms of the MPP as above we obtain the publicly observed history, or
public ltration, which is right-continuous and constructed in the three steps
below:
G = Gpub := fG+t : t 2 [0; 1]g ;
where G+1 = (G1; f(1; Y i(1))gi2I) and for each t in [0; 1), conventionally
G+t =
\
s>t
Gs;
with the -algebras Gt generated as the join of the three -algebras corre-
sponding to the items (i), (iii) and (iv) from §2.1.6, dates included, namely:
Gt = _s2[0;t)
 
((s;Npub(s)); Js; f(s; Y j-pub(s)gj2Js)

:
2.1.7 Disclosure ltration. The key concept for the paper is that of a public
ltration G (in the sense of §2.1.6) which is a particular kind of subltration
of the join _iYprivi of the private ltrations of §2.1.5. Its denition hinges
on disclosure of observations at or above the current value of a reference
process which, crucially, is required to be predictable with respect to the
public information that it itself generates.
We dene the disclosure ltrations consistently generated from the (pri-
vate) ltrations fYprivi : i 2 Ig via the G-predictable censoring lter  =
2As the Referee points out, it possible to construct the public ltration entirely from a
vector of Poisson processes (with appropriate thinning), so that disclosersare identied
by coincidence of certain arrival times.
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(it : i 2 I), to be public ltrations satisfying additionally the following three
conditions for each 0 < t < 1. These say that at each disclosure time there
are disclosing agents as in (v), with their observations made public, as in
(vi), because, as in (vii), these are above their censoring thresholds:
(v) The set Jt is non-empty i¤Npub(t) > Npub(t ).
(vi) If Npub(t) > Npub(t ); then Y j-pub(t) = Y j-obs(t); for each j 2 Jt.
(vii) If N i(t) > N i(t ) and Y i-obst > it, for some i 2 I;
then Npub(t) > Npub(t ) and i 2 Jt.
For such a ltration Gpub, the counting-process arrival times occuring in
(0; 1) in (ii) of §2.1.6 will be termed the voluntary disclosure event times (or
just disclosure times if m = 1): pub0 ; 
pub
1 ; ::: .
2.2 Optimal censoring problem
Associated with a xed disclosure ltrationG = fG+t g, consistently generated
via  as in §2.1.7, is the process obtained by taking contingent expectations
of the time-1 output Z1 with respect to the time-t information subsets:
t 7! E[Zi1jGt] ;
this process is interpreted as aG-predictable valuation process orG-forecasting
process. The optimal censoring problem addressed below calls for the con-
struction of a ltration G, necessarily unique, whose associated forecasting
process is the left-sided-in-time pointwise supremum over all G-forecasting
processes, that is, for each time t 2 (0; 1) and each agent i;
E[Zi1jG;t] = supG E[Zi1jGt]; (OC)
where the supremum ranges over the disclosure ltrations G = fG+t g of
§2.1.7. In (OC) both sides of the equation depend only the public information
available to the left of the date3 t: By denition such a G, if it exists, is
unique. The main results of the paper give the solution in §3 of the optimal
censoring problem for the geometric Brownian signal processes X of §2.1;
Theorem 1 corresponds to the one-dimensional case m = 1, Theorem 1m to
the case of arbitrary integer dimension m  1.
3It is highly signicant to the analysis that the date t is inferable from the conditioning
-algebra Gt (likewise for Yit), hence its inclusion in the construction.
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Remarks 1. Informally, the censoring problem requires agent i to reach
disclosure/suppression decisions using only the history of all prior public
information.
2. With the ltering theory language above, the optimal censoring problem
amounts to the construction of a censoring-lter (process) t with the fol-
lowing properties (i) to (iii):
(i) the disclosure subltration G of _i2IYprivi , generated through suppression
of observations by reference to the process ; is consistently generated from
the private ltrations fYi : i = 1; :::;mg;
(ii)  is G-predictable (this is crucial);
(iii) for each i 2 I and for each time instant t 2 (0; 1), it is chosen to be
a cuto¤ maximizing the expected value of Zi1, given only past public infor-
mation, and best response to the simultaneous censoring choices of jt for
j 6= i (which is why  needs to be G-predictable). Of course, this yields an
individual private valuation for each agent.
3. The role of G above is to formalize the censoring of the private observation
processes relative to information publicbefore any time-t disclosure, so in
general distinct from the optional valuation process of the next section (§2.3)
E[Zi1jG+t ];
which models the later right-continuous public valuation at time t.
4. In Remark 2 the agent is a maximizer of an instantaneous objective linked
to the terminal output (via its estimator). The alternative approach is to
establish a single overall performance indicator for the entire trajectory of
the estimator. Optimality of overall economic behaviour induced by instan-
taneous (sometimes called myopic) objectives is established for a class of
models related to ours in Feldman [14].
2.3 Application to asset-price modelling
We consider a single rmZit in isolation, so omitting i when convenient. The
manager of the rm (agent i) makes a mandatory declaration at time t = 1
of its (fundamental) value which, taking a Bayesian stance, is the managers
estimate/forecast of the rms economic state Z1 using Y1; namely
~1 := E[Z1jG1; Y1] = E[Z1jG+1 ];
since G+1 = ((1; Y1);G1). Below we use a standard martingale construction
to create an asset-price process under Q (cf. [4]); we then note the option
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values that censoring introduces, and observe that a censor, which induces
indi¤erence between disclosure and non-disclosure, preserves the risk-neutral
character of the asset-price under Q.
Given a public ltration G, the associated forecasting process of §2.2.
yields an analogue S of an asset-price process with
St := E[E[Z1jG+1 ]jG+t ]; for 0  t  1:
This construction also turns the reference measure Q (of the stochastic
basis) into a risk-neutral valuation measure, a fact implied by the conditional
mean formula, which for t < s asserts that
E[SsjG+t ] = E[E[E[Z1jG+1 ]jG+s ]jG+t ] = E[E[Z1jG+1 ]jG+t ] = St:
The disclosure cuto¤  is uniquely determined below by the asset-price
process S; as follows. Fix t < s: At time t suppose that agent i is com-
mitted to using a cuto¤ t and is to choose a disclosure cuto¤  for use at
the later date s. Assume, until further notice, absence of any public dis-
closures in the interval (t; s): Let Ds() be the disclosure event of time s
corresponding to the agent i observing a value of Ys at or above , so that
in terms of indicator functions
1Ds() = 1N(s)>N(s )  1Y (s): (D)
Equation (D) suggests that the Black-Scholes value of the one-or-nothing
binary option on Ys with strike  (represented by 1Y (s)) will emerge at the
heart of our line of reasoning.
Next consider the complementary event NDs() in which, given ; the
market computes a forecast for Z1 as being ~s = E[Z1jNDs();G+t ]: If the
agent wishes to maximise the asset valuation S at time s the choice  will
induce indi¤erence between disclosure and non-disclosure when Ys =  is
observed i¤4
E[Z1jYs = ;G+t ] = E[Z1jNDs();G+t ]:
This observation and conditioning on knowledge at time t of the value5
~t := E[Z1jG+t ]
4For simplicity, here and below we adopt the equational convention that conditioning
on an equation Yt = y is to be read as implying its disclosure.
5This equals E[Z1jYt = t;Gt], absent any disclosure.
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induces the following simple relation between the equilibrium value ~s and
~t; an even simpler limiting form arises in Theorem 1 in §3.1. The relation
involves the distribution of Zests := E[Z1jYs;G+t ]; i.e of the time-s estimator
of the terminal output Z1; conditional on the observation of Ys by the agent.
(In (2) below, direct substitution causes a spurious inner conditioning; the
Landau notation below has the sense: o(h)=h! 0; as h # 0:)
Proposition 1 (Conditional Bayes formula; cf. [19]). In the single
agent setting, conditional on there being no disclosure in the interval (t; s);
with ~t := E[Z1jG+t ] and ~s := E[Z1jYs = s;G+t ], the equation
~s = E[Z1jNDs(s); G+t ] (1)
is equivalent for qts := (s  t)t to
(1  qts)(~t   ~s) + o(s  t) = qts
Z
z~s
(z   ~s)dQ(Zests  zjG+t )
= qts
Z
z~s
(z   ~s)dQ(E[Z1jYs;G+t ]  zjG+t ):(2)
The proof is in §5.1. The indi¤erence choiceof  is of signicance: we
cite our earlier result here as:
Proposition 2 (Risk neutrality, [27] cf. [16]). In the setting of Propo-
sition 1, with D = Ds() and  tD := Q[DjG+t ], its market probability (condi-
tional at time t), equation (1) is equivalent to
St = E[S1jG+t ] =  tD  E[S1jDs(s);G+t ] + (1   tD)~s: (3)
Consequently, the computation of the (unique) solution for ~s reduces in
the Black-Scholes setting to a simple application of the Black-Scholes formu-
las, using the model parameters of §2.1; see the discussion of Theorem 1 and
the equivalent equation (7) below in §3.1.1.
Remark. From a market-valuation perspective on asset prices, the value
of the future cuto¤ s (as above) must be impounded in the market measure,
but this is exactly what (3) describes; so we may validly regard the risk-
neutral measure here as a summary of an underlying equilibrium market-
model, such as is described by [10].
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3 Intra-period valuation: non-disclosure de-
cay
In this section a consistently generated ltration G with its censoring lter
 as dened in §2.1.7 is given and assumed to be an optimal censoring lter
in the sense of (OC). The latter is seen to be uniquely characterized as a
piecewise-deterministic Markov process (inevitably so  see [7]) capable of
generating a public ltration from fYprivi : i 2 Ig under which the censoring
process is predictable. First, we consider the simpler case m = 1 (leaving the
general case m > 1 to §3.2), and state the theorem asserting an explicit solu-
tion to the ltering problem (arising from a cuto¤ equationcharacterizing
s, for t < s < +; which takes the form of a simple di¤erential equation).
The proof of the theorem is in §5.2, but we comment after the statement
that the optimal censor satises a Bayesian updating rule at time s, from
which our di¤erential equation follows.
3.1 Single agent case
The situation when m = 1; and only the i-th agent is involved, follows. As
in §2.3, between public disclosure dates, we must refer not only to the censor
t which is applied to the observation Yt, but also to the image process
~t := E[Z1jYt = t;Gt] = E[Z1jNDt(t);Gt]:
In the Black-Scholes framework the time-t regression function  7! E[Z1jYt =
;Gt] is monotonic. In the single agent context, since the single observer is
the only source of any expansion of the public ltration, it is in principle
possible to work in the language of disclosure/censoring solely of the forecast
E[Z1jYt;Gt] by reference to ~t, rather than of the disclosure/censoring of the
observation Yt. However, in the multiple agent setting this cannot readily
be done, since other agents may expand the public ltration and so the
connection (in equilibrium) between ~it and 
i
t is more complicated. So one
simply has to chase both sets of variables. For technical reasons connected
with re-startingthe Wiener process (at t and at pub  (t)), the censors need
to be re-scaled to unity at the re-starting date, hence the appearance also
of a further process ^t in the Corollary below. (See §2.1.4 for the relevant
parameters.) In Theorem 1 reference is made to a xed public ltration G
and also to general public ltrations G as in (OC) in §2.2 above; moreover, a
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connection is made between the optional valuation E[Z1j G+t ] at the disclosure
in (i), and the predictable valuation process E[Z1j Gt] in (ii) cf. §2.2.
Theorem 1 (Decay Rule for m = 1; with only the i-th agent present).
For the model of §2, suppose that t is a càdlàg optimal observation-censoring
lter, generating a disclosure ltration G = f G+t g with associated sequence
of G-disclosure arrival times 0 = pub0 < 
pub
1 < 
pub
2 < ::: < 
pub
` < 1; of
random (nite) length `  N(1) at which disclosures occur.
The corresponding output-forecast process has the following properties:
(i) disclosure updating condition (re-initialization)
g(
pub
  (t)) := E[Z1j G+t ]  E[Z1j Gt; Yt]; if t = pub  (t); (4)
or explicitly here, for t = pub  (t);
E[Z1j G+t ] = E[Z1jYt; Gt] = kY t ;
with
k = f 1 ;  = i1 = pi=(pi + p0);
(ii) in each inter-arrival interval (i.e. between disclosure times)
supG E[Z1jGt] = E[Z1j Gt] = g((pub  (t)) exp
 
 
Z t
_
sds
!
; for pub  (t)  t < pub+ (t);
where, on the extreme left of the display above, the left-sided-in-time supre-
mum (as in (OC)) ranges over all public ltrations G = fG+t g and, on the
extreme right: g is as in (i) above, while in the valuation formula there is a
thinned decay-intensity given by
t = t[2(^t=2)  1] > 0 with ^2t = 2i (20 + 2i )(1  t); (5)
(iii) in each inter-arrival interval, the cuto¤ t for the disclosure of an ob-
servation of Yt satises
supG E[Z1jGt] = ktt;
where  = ~
i
: [0; 1] ! R (with (1) = 1) is a decreasing deterministic
weighting function of time, identied explicitly in Lemma 2 of §5.2.
In particular, the optimal censor t is a unique, piecewise-deterministic
Markov process.
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The proof is in §5.2. The cuto¤ for disclosure of the output-forecast ob-
tained in Theorem 1 has the prescribed explicit form, since ~t = supG E[Z1jGt]
satises the censoring di¤erential equation
~0t =  ~tt; for pubn 1 < t < pubn ; (6)
referred to in §1. It may be interpreted in the context of §2.3 as expressing the
risk premium of information suppression, in a way which hints at generaliza-
tion to a broader class of models, one where regime shifts are accompanied by
optional, so strategic, protectiveactivity, their exercise rates balancing the
marginal protective-option value. The emergence of a piecewise-deterministic
process, in the sense of [11], is not a surprise see [23]. The following result
explains how silence(non-disclosure) is penalized less and less as time plays
out.
Corollary. In the setting of Theorem 1, the output-forecast process ~t
for 0 < t < 1 has the following properties:
(a) its jumps occur at the disclosure times pubn and are upward;
(b) between jumps, the output-valuation process has the representation
~t = ^tg(
pub
n 1); where the (rescaled cuto¤ ) deterministic function ^t satis-
es:
^0t =  ^tt; for pubn 1 < t < pubn ; with ^(pubn 1) = 1;
(c) (decreasing thinning) in any interval between disclosure times the rel-
ative decay-intensity t=t is decreasing;
(d) between consecutive non-disclosure intervals the intra-period relative
decay intensity t=t decreases (to zero as t! 1).
Proof. This is immediate the routine proof is omitted. 
3.1.1 Game-theoretic Aspects of Theorem 1
We stress the role of game-theoretic principles at work: the indi¤erence prin-
ciple, Bayesian updating, equilibrium, underlying the proof. Given informa-
tion at time 0 < t < 1; the cuto¤ value s is characterized at any time s with
t < s < +(t)  1 by the observers indi¤erence at time s; when observing
Ys; between disclosing the observed value if Ys = s and not disclosing it; this
is because the public valuation is identical in both circumstances. Indeed,
the valuation is identical, because in the time interval (t; s] with probability
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1   (s   t)t + o(s   t) (as s # t) the agent has not observed Ys, and this
event cannot be distinguished by outsiders from the event that the agent
observed Ys, but did not disclose the observed value of Ys (since it was be-
low s). This yields the indi¤erence (equilibrium) condition as conditional
Bayesformula:
~s = E[Z1jNDs(s);G+t ]; (7)
where, as earlier ~s := E[Z1jYs = s;G+t ] and G = fG+t g here denotes the
public ltration.
The signicance of (7) is that it is a special case of the Nash Equilibrium
condition (10) below; the equation (7) rst appears in the static model of
Dye [13] to model rationality of partial (voluntary) disclosures, as a contrast
to the total disclosure principle (unravelling) of Grossman and Hart [17].
3.1.2 Cuto¤s and the Black-Scholes formula
A consequence of (7) (and of (10) below) and is a Black-Scholes formula
for the cuto¤  = ~s applied to the forecast (rather than the observation).
The calculation goes back at least to [19] (cf. [15]), where (7) in the present
context reduces to:
F    =
q
1  qHF (); where (8)
HF () = E[(   F )+] =
Z
(   x)+dQ(F  x) =
Z
x
Q(F  x)dx;
(cf. Prop. 1 and §5.1). Here F denotes the random variable E[Z1jYs;G+t ],
with mean F (conditional at time t+); q = (s  t)t is the probability with
which an observation occurs (independently of F ) by time s, and HF () is
the lower rst partial moment below a target , well-known in risk man-
agement6, briey termed (in view of its key role) the hemi-mean function.
The log-normal F above, prompts a standardization in terms of the pa-
rameters ;  for the solution  = LN(; ) of
1   = HLN(;): (9)
The behaviour of the solution derives from the properties of the Black-Scholes
put-formula (with strike ): The put formula for strike  and expiry at time
6See for example McNeil, Frey and Embrechts [26], Section 2.2.4.
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1; conditional on an initial asset valuation of ~t at time t < 1; yields
HLN() = 

log(=~t) +
1
2
2(1  t)

p
1  t

  t

log(=~t)  122(1  t)

p
1  t

;
with  the standard normal distribution.
Consequently, for any time t in the intra-period (between voluntary dis-
closures) setting the strike in the formula above to be  = ~s yields in the
limit as s # t; ~s identical with ~t; then the two terms add up to give, as in
(5), ~t2(t=2):
3.1.3 Other Comments
The decay-intensity rate t is composed of two factors both having economic
signicance. First, the Poisson intensity measures the instantaneous oppor-
tunity cost of the arrival of an observation of information about the output
valuation, and impounds the chance both for a valuation upgrade (through
a good observation), and for the suppression of poor observation value. Sec-
ondly, the intensity  is thinned by the probability of suppressing poor val-
uation, the e¤ect of a protective put. Over time the protective put loses
value and tends to zero as the precision improves (i.e. the volatility goes to
zero).
To see the details of the formula intuitively, recall that, as above, it
is assumed that the observer chooses to achieve the maximum valuation,
and thus makes a voluntary disclosure according to the rule: nd the cuto¤
function t 7! t such that for t = obsn :
(i) disclose credibly the value of Y , when Yt  t; or, equivalently, the public
output-forecast Zestt := Et[Z1jY (obsn )]; and
(ii) make no disclosure, when Yt < t.
Replacing Yt by Zestt := E[Z1jG+t ]; one may restate the Y -cuto¤ problem (of
choosing t) in isomorphic terms as a cuto¤ problem for Z
est
t (i.e. of choos-
ing its corresponding cuto¤ ~t), assuming the regression function ~mt(y) :=
Et[Z1jYt = y] is monotonic.
3.2 Multiple agent case
We now consider the general case m > 1. Here the starting point is a system
of equations that relates the values fit : i = 1; :::;mg to each other by
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reference to a general Bayesian updating rule having the form of a system of
(subgame) Nash equilibrium conditions for i = 1; :::;m:
E[Zi1j(8j)NDjt (jt);Gt] = E[Zi1jNDjt (jt) for all j 6= i; Yi = it;Gt]; (10)
with NDjt () being the non-disclosure event (of time t). The intended mean-
ing is that, contingent on the information available prior to time t; in the
event that all of the agents make no disclosures (for lack of observations, or
because observations lie at or below their respective ltering-censor value)
and the i-th agents observation is identical to the value of the respective
ltering-censor it, the corresponding output estimate value (i.e. Z
i
1 in ex-
pectation) is the same whether, or not, that agent chooses to disclose the
observation. (Recall the equational convention in the footnote of §2.3.) The
conditions (10) generalize (3) of §2.3 see also §3.1.1 below.
Note that NDjt () is complementary to Dt(); as earlier dened in §2.3
(though here in respect of the j-th agent).
In the inter-arrival period the absence of any disclosure from all of the
m observation processes will inuence the decay rate of each of the optimal
observation ltering censors di¤erentially, i.e. the ltering equation is bound
to express the interdependence owing from the Nash Equilibrium conditions
(10) above. To express the explicit form, we need a number of parameters
derived from the volatilities of §2.1. Using an abbreviating tilde notation,
put
20i := 
2
0 + 
2
i and ~
2
0i(t) := (1  t)20i;
and analogously:
~pi(t) : = 1=[(1  t)2i ]; ~p(t) :=
Xm
i=0
~pi(t); ~i(t) := ~pi(t)=~p(t)  i;
~ i(t) : = ~pi(t)=(~p(t)  ~pi(t))   i := pi=(p  pi):
Of particular signicance is the function ~i(t); which denotes for given t the
(conditional) partial covariance (cf. [8]) of the i-th component of (:::; 0 ~W 01 t+
i ~W
i
1 t; :::) on the remaining components, where ~W denotes the Wiener
process W re-started at time t:
We may now state the general theorem; use of the subscript hyphere
is explained in the discussion below. The function ~
i
m corresponds to ~
i
in
Theorem 1, and is derived in Lemma 2m of §5.4. Below ~it = supG E[Zi1jGt];
is as earlier, but yit replaces it to allow ~yit to have another meaning, corre-
sponding to a rescaling of Y is to ~Y
i
s in the proof. The notation here of G and
G is as in Theorem 1.
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Theorem 1m (Filtering rule during continued non-disclosure:
m  1). For the model of §2, suppose yt = (:::; yit; :::) is a càdlàg optimal
censoring lter generating a disclosure ltration G with associated sequence
of G-disclosure-arrival times 0 = pub0 < 
pub
1 < 
pub
2 < ::: < 
pub
` < 1 of
random (nite) length ` Pmi=1 N i(1); at which disclosure events occur.
Then, for 0  n  `; the corresponding output-forecast process has the
following properties:
(i) disclosure updating condition (the i-th agents re-initialization)
gi(t) := E[Zi1jG+t ] = E[Zi1jfY jt : j 2 Jtg]; if t = pub  (t); (11)
(ii) in each inter-arrival interval  = pub  (t)  t < pub+ (t)
supG E[Zi1jGt] = E[Zi1j Gt] = kim~
i
mg
i
() exp

 
Z t

agg(s)ds

;
where on the extreme left, the left-sided-in-time supremum ranges over public
ltrations G = fG+t g and, on the extreme-right, the correlation-aggregated
decay-intensity vagg is
agg(t) :=
X
j
j
 j

1 +
X
h
h
j
h
0

jhyp(t);
and
ihyp(t) := 

1
2
ii~0i
q
1  ~2i

~i;
and ~
i
m =
~
i
indiv  ~agg with
~
i
indiv := (i; (1  0)~20)(i1; (1  0)~2i ); and ~agg =
Y
j
(j; ~
2
0j);
(iii) in each inter-arrival interval between disclosure event times, the disclo-
sure censor yit of the i-th agent is given for  = 
pub
n 1  t < pubn by:
1
i
log yit =  
1
i i
Z t

ihyp(s)ds
  1
0

1
1 1
Z t

1hyp(s)ds+
2
2 2
Z t

2hyp(s)ds+ :::

:
In particular, the optimal censor yt is a unique, piecewise-deterministic
Markov process.
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Note that for m = 1 this reduces to Theorem 1. The proof is in §5.3 and
depends (as does Theorem 1) on the factorization of the process M = M i
(with M for Mi) for xed t in the self-evident form
M1 = M0 exp(MW1   1
2
2M) = Mt exp(M
~W1 t   1
2
2M(1  t));
where ~W i is W i re-started at time t:
Discussion of Theorem 1m. This result builds on Theorem 1, hence bears
appropriate similarities (e.g. updating at disclosure dates), and relies on
the conditional Bayesformula (7), so we now comment only on what is most
signicantly di¤erent here form > 1, namely the need to disaggregate the co-
dependance. To dene the observation cuto¤s of the m observing agents, one
rst constructs m corresponding agents, termed hypothetical agents, each of
whom faces a suppressed-observation problem of the kind considered in The-
orem 1, but in isolation. This introduces two features: rstly, an amended-
mean factor L i(t), multiplying the current conditional mean of the observa-
tion process (dened in Theorem M of §5.3 and reecting incremental e¤ects
of a single agent, that are based only on loading and precision factors) and,
secondly, the partial covariance ~i; arising from the use of the Schur com-
plement (see [3, Note 4.27, p.120], cf. [21, Ch. 27], [22, §§46.26-28]). The
corresponding hypothetical observation-cuto¤s are later aggregated to yield
observation cuto¤s of the original m-agent problem. From these observation
cuto¤s a current forecast ~it of the i-th output Z
i
1 is derived. Recall that
in Theorem 1 the formula for ~t required the use of a rescaled function ^t
(with unit value at t = ; the latest disclosure date). Likewise in Theorem
1m we also see a function ^
i
t used in similar fashion to construct ~
i
t; here the
size-constant kim corresponds to f
i, and reects relative output magnitude,
just as i reects relative precision.
4 Application: Market valuation with cen-
sored voluntary disclosures
The di¤erential equations of Theorem 1m can be used to derive comparative
statics of price formation in an asset market, in which investors expect vol-
untary disclosures (with positive probability) at all times between the two
xed mandatory disclosure dates. These comparative statics are concerned
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with intervals of time during which the agents are known to be privately and
intermittently observing noisy signals of the asset values, arising from the
common e¤ect. The interpretation of §2.3 extends here to
Sit := E[E[Zi1jG+1 ]jG+t ]
as an asset-price process (with expectations under Q as the markets risk-
neutral valuation measure).
Agent i is endowed intermittently with private information about the
evolution of the i-th asset price via the martingale Y it ; and can voluntarily
disclose information about the asset to the market. At times t strictly be-
tween consecutive public disclosure arrival times, conditioning on G+t or on
Gt yields identical forecasts of the time-1 valuation E[Zi1jG+1 ], so correspond-
ingly the asset price Sit is identical with ~
i
t = E[E[Zi1jG+1 ]jGt]; where ~it is the
unique valuation-cuto¤ given by Theorem 1m: Furthermore, §2.3 describes
disclosure behaviour as being incentivized so that the asset price gives the
current stock-holders (investors) asset valuations that are maximal given the
available public information.
The e¤ects on price formation may thus be studied by recourse to the
observation cuto¤s employed by the respective agents in terms of the para-
meters of the model: the precisions pi; the loading factors i, and the private
observation arrival intensities i: It is interesting to note the predictions
about suppression. Since the correlation between rms and the environment
factor are positive, the formulas established above imply that a good-news
bandwagon e¤ect holds: ceteris paribus, agents all choose a higher cuto¤
(relative to the single agent case m = 1), reducing the probability that they
will release private observations. Additionally, there is an intuitively clear
estimator-quality e¤ect, which leads to agents being partitioned into below-
and above-average precision(over the m-agent population), as in the theo-
rems that follow. Those with below-average precision are shown to adopt a
lower cuto¤ (relative to the single agent case), and ceteris paribus increase
the probability that they will release private observations, with the reverse
holding for the above-average.
Bandwagon Theorem. In any intra-period the presence of correlation
increases the precision parameter of the cuto¤ and hence raises the cuto¤:
^LN(
~i; ~0i) < ^LN(
~i; i~0i) < ^LN

~i; i~0i
q
1  ~2i

:
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where ^LN(; ) denotes the unique solution of the following equation in y :
(1  y) = HLN(y; );
and represents the normalized cuto¤ in the single agent case, as in (9).
Proof. This is immediate from the static model of [15, §6].
When the correlation is positive, there is also a counter-vailing precision
e¤ect on the related hypothetical agents cuto¤, arising from the amended
mean factor L i (see the discussion of Theorem 1m above), when the actual
agent has below-average precision, as dened below.
Estimator-Quality Theorem. Suppose that m  2 and i > 0 for all i.
The amended mean L i(t) of the hypothetical rm i increases with pi and
exp

 i(1  t)
2(p  pi)

< L i(t) < exp
 
i
 
1 + i 1
n 1

(1  t)
2pav, i
!
;
where pav, i : =
p  pi
n  1 + i :
In particular, if the loading index is identical for all rms, then
L i(t) < L j(t) i¤ pi < pj:
Otherwise, if 0 < i < j and pi < pj; then also L i(t) < L j(t).
The amended mean is a strict deator, i.e. L i(t) < 1; i¤ pi is below the
loading-adjusted competitor average, i.e.
pi <
p
n  1 + i := pav,-i
so that for i = 1 one has pav,-i = p=n:
Proof. This again is immediate from the static model of [15, §6].
Thus low-precision managers are more likely to make a disclosure, but
by denition the disclosure will be less precise. Hence, in terms of giving it
weighting in the updating rules, investors will give less weight to disclosure
of bad news by such imprecise managers.
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5 Proofs
We begin in §5.1 with a Proof of Proposition 1 and use it in §5.2 to prove
Theorem 1, but only after we have prepared the ground with the calculations
in two lemmas. In §5.3 we prove Theorem 1m; the argument will require
generalizations of the lemmas of §5.2, and these are relegated to §5.4.
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In the notation of §2, we have
~s =
Q(N(s) = N(t))  E[Z1jG+t ] +Q(N(t) < N(s)) 
R
z1~s z1dQ(E[Z1jYs;G
+
t ]  z1jG+t )
Q(N(s) = N(t)) +Q(N(t) < N(s))Q(E[Z1jYs;G+t ]  ~sjG+t )
=
(1  (s  t)t)  ~t +Q(N(t) < N(s)) 
R
z1~s z1dQ(E[Z1jYs;G
+
t ]  z1jG+t )
(1  (s  t)t) + (s  t)tQ(E[Z1jYs;G+t ]  ~sjG+t )
:
So putting qts = (s  t)t; cross-multiplying and re-arranging one has
(1  qts)(~t   ~s) + o(s  t) = qts
Z
z1~s
(z1   ~s)dQ(E[Z1jYs;G+t ]  z1jG+t )
=  qts
Z
z1~s
Q(E[Z1jYs;G+t ]  z1jG+t )dz1;
where the last line is from integrating by parts. 
5.2 Proof of Theorem 1
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1. Although m = 1 below,
having in mind the notational needs of §5.3; where m > 1; it is helpful to
employ here a general index i for the single agent of interest (rather than to
specialize i = 1), thereby anticipating the later general case. Also, as m = 1;
the index i can be omitted at will, whenever convenient. We begin with some
auxiliary results stated as Lemmas 1 and 2, which will require the notation
(; 2) := e
1
2
( 1)2 :
The exponent 1
2
(  1)2 in  above corresponds to the second-order term
of Itôs Lemma for the power function t ! t; a recurring feature of the
regression formulas (from Lemma 1). For other parameters refer to §2.1.
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Recall the tilde notation of §3.2 that, for any constant ; we write ~ for
the function ~2(t) := 2  (1  t); with value corresponding to re-starting the
model at time t: In particular, with 20i := 
2
i
2
0 + (ii)
2, we write
~2i (t) = 
2
i (1  t) and 20i(t) = 2i [20 + 2i ](1  t) = 2i ~20i:
For convenience, we may denote X also by M0: For the Wiener processes
W i, recall the corresponding Wiener process re-started at time t by
~W is := W
i
t+s  W it :
(So W0 = 0.) Omitting su¢ ces and writing W for Mi ;
Mt+s = Mt exp(W ~Ws   1
2
2W s): (12)
We need two lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Valuation of Z1 given observation Y1 for m = 1). Put
 = i1 = pi=(p0 + pi):
Then
E[Z1jY i1 = y;G1] = ky for k = ki1 = (f i)1 :
Proof. We cite and apply a formula from [15, Prop. 10.3]. To distinguish
notational contexts, we use overbars on letters when citing formulas from
there. The noisy observation there, T ; of a random (state) variable X takes
the form T = X Y ; where X and Y are independent random variables, with
their log-normal distributions having underlying normal precision parameters
pX ; pY respectively. The required formula is
E[ Xj T ] = K( T );
where  = pY =p for p = pX + pY and
K = exp

 + (  1)
2p

:
We will take X = X1 and Y = M
1=
1 ; with M = M
i and  = i below.
We rst compute the corresponding constants pX ; pY and K: Substituting
s = 1  t = t in (12) above, gives
X1 = X1 t exp(0 ~W 0t  
20
2
t);
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and
M
1=
1 = M
1=
1 t exp(
Mi
i
~W it  
(Mi )
2
2i
t) = M
1=
1 t exp(i ~W
i
t  
1
2
i
2
it):
Conditional on the realizations ofX1 t andM
1=
1 t; X and Y have respective
underlying conditional variances of 20t and 
2
it; as 
M
i =i = i: So the
corresponding regression coe¢ cient  for X on Y is
2=(ii)
2
2=(ii)2 + 1=20
=
1=(i)
2
1=(i)2 + 1=20
=
pi
pi + p0
= i1;
having cancelled t > 0 from numerator and denominator; this remains
constant as t varies, and so also in the passage as t! 0: Also
1=p =
t
1=2i + 1=
2
0
;
so K = K(t)! 1 as t! 0: Finally, since Y it = ZitM it = f iXit M it ;
T = (Y i1=f
i)1= = X1M
1=
1 = X Y ;
and so, conditioning on Y i1 = y; and setting k = f
1 ;
E[Zi1j T ] = E[f iX1 j T ] = f i( T ) = f i((Y i1=f i)1=) = f i(y=f i) = ky: 
Below the deterministic functions ~
i
factor into ~
i
indiv;
~agg to anticipate
m-fold versions which separateindividual and aggregate e¤ects of agents.
Lemma 2 (Time-t conditional law of the valuation of Z1, given ob-
servation Yt for m = 1). Conditional on Y it = y; the time-t distribution
of the time-1 valuation E[Z1jY1;G1] is that of
k~
i
yZ^t := k~
i
indiv
~aggy
Z^t;
with k = ki1 as in Lemma 1, and:
(i)
 = i1;
~
i
indiv := (
0
t (i)
i
t)
; ~agg := (; 
2
i ~
2
0i),
it : = (i; 
2
i ~
2
i ) and 
0
t (i) = (i; ~
2
0);
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(ii) Z^t log-normal, its underlying mean-zero normal of variance ^
2
t = 
2
i ~
2
0i.
In particular, this time-t distribution has mean given by
E[Z1jY it = y;Gt] = k~
i
indiv
~aggy
:
Proof. From (12) with M = M i and any  > 0
M t+s = M

0 exp(MWt+s  
1
2
2M(t+ s)) = M

t exp(M ~Ws  
1
2
2Ms):
So, for s = 1  t;
M 1 = t()M

t exp(M
~W1 t   1
2
22M(1  t));
where the last term has unit-mean and
t() = (; ~
2
M) = (; 
2
i ~
2
i ):
In particular, for  =  = i1 (i.e. for  as in Lemma 1) and M = M
i;
M1 = 
i
t Mt  exp(iiW it (1  t) 
1
2
22i
2
i (1  t));
where it = (; 
2
i ~
2
i ) = (
i
1; 
2
i ~
2
i ); likewise, for M = X and  = i;
Zi1 = f
iXi1 = 
0
t (i)  Zit  exp(i0 ~W 01 t  
1
2
2i
2
0(1  t));
where 0t (i) = (i; ~
2
0): Combining, as Y
i
t = Z
i
tM
i
t ; for any  > 0 :
(Y i1 )
 = (0t (i)
i
tZitM it )exp(i0 ~W 01 t 2i20(1 t)=2)exp(ii ~W i1 t 2i2i (1 t)=2):
But
[i0 ~W
0
1 t + ii ~W
i
1 t] = i[0W
0
t (1  t) + i ~W i1 t]
has variance 22i ~
2
0i; where ~
2
0i = [
2
0 + 
2
i ](1  t): So taking
Z^t() := exp

i[0 ~W
0
1 t + i ~W
i
1 t] 
1
2
22i ~
2
0i

;
which has unit-mean and variance 22i ~
2
0i, gives
(Y i1 )
 = (0t
i
t  Y it )(; 2i ~20i)Z^t(): (13)
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In particular, condition on Y it = y; take  =  above, and set
Z^t := Z^t();
then, by (13) and with k as in Lemma 1 above, the conditional time-t distri-
bution of E[Z1jY1;G1] is that of the variable Zestt given by
Zestt := k(Y
i
1 )
 = k(0t
i
t  y)(; 2i ~20i)Z^t: 
Proof of Theorem 1. Below we suppress reference to the unique agent i:
We condition on the event pub  (t)  t < s < pub+ (t); i.e. that there has been
no subsequent disclosure in (t; s]: Denote by t the càdlàg censor assumed
in Theorem 1. For t  u  s; let NDu() denote the event that, at time u;
either N(u) = 0 or the agent observes Ys to be below ; and let ~u be the
time-u evaluation of the random variable E[Z1jY1;G1]; then
~u = E[Z1jNDu(u);G+t ]:
As in §2.3, by the Indi¤erence Principle (cf. [15, §11 (Appendix 8)]), the
unique cuto¤ value u for Yu and the time-u evaluation ~u of E[Z1jY1;G1] are
related by
~u = E[Z1jNDu(u);G+t ] = E[Z1jYu = u;G+t ] = k~uu;
with ~u = ~
i
u denoting ~
i
evaluated at u; as in Lemma 2 above, so that
~u = k~u

u; or log ~u =  log u + log k~u:
For u > t; put ^u := ~u=~t (so that ^t = 1), thus rescaling E[E[Z1jY1;G1]jG+t ];
the time-t valuation of E[Z1jY1;G1] to unity; we now work as though ~t = 1:
Let the corresponding time-u valuation be the random variable Z^u of Lemma
2. The underlying zero-mean normal random variable of the Lemma has
variance ^2u := 
2~20i(u). In the notation of Lemma 2, with qts := (s   t)t
the formula of Prop. 1 gives
(1  qts)(1  ^s) + o(s  t) = qts
Z
zs^s
(zs   ^s)dQ(Z^s  zsjGt; ~t = 1)
=  qts
Z
zs^s
Q(Z^s  zsjGt; ~t = 1)dzs:
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Dividing by  qts and rearranging the di¤erential term, by the Black-Scholes
formula
 (1  qts) 1
t
^s   1
(s  t) =
Z
zs~s
Q(Z^s  zsjGt; ~t = 1)dzs
= ^s
 
log(^s) +
1
2
^2(1  t)
^
p
1  t
!
  
 
log(^s)  12 ^2(1  t)
^
p
1  t
!
;
up to o(s  t)=[(s  t)t]: Rearranging once more and, using the abbreviating
notation ^2t for the variance,
(1 qts) 1
t
^s   1
(s  t) =  ^s
 
log(^s) +
1
2
^2t
^t
!
+
 
log(^s)  12 ^2t
^t
!
+
o(s  t)
(s  t)t :
Because yu is càdlàg, so also are ~u and ^u; so the terms on the right have a
limit as s # t: As qts ! 0, the function ^(u) is seen to be right-di¤erentiable
at t; and, since ( u) = 1  (u);
1
t
^0(t) =  [2(^t=2)  1]; (14)
or equivalently, recalling that ^2t = 
2
i (
2
0 + 
2
i )(1  t);
~0(t)
~(t)
=  t[2(^t=2)  1]: (15)
Now unxing t; we permit t to vary over an interval during which there is
no disclosure. Solving the di¤erential equation, by integrating from the last
disclosure date  (t)  0 to the date t; and conditioning on t being prior to
the next disclosure +(t); gives the following:
log (~(t)=~( (t))) =  
Z t
 
u[2(^u=2)  1]du;
~(t) = ~( (t)) exp

 
Z t
 
u[2(^u=2)  1]du

:
Note that as ^u  0; the factor [2(^s=2)  1] is non-negative.
So the conditional time-t evaluation of E[Z1jY1] is given explicitly by
~t = E[E1[Z1jY1]jNDt(t);Gt] = E[Z1jNDt(t);Gt] = ^(t)E[Z1jY;G];
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for  =  (t) (and with t unxed), where now
^(t) := exp

 
Z t
 
u[2(^u=2)  1]du

;
by abuse of notation, as this function satises (14), but with ^( (t)) = 1.
To obtain the explicit form, apply Lemma 2 with  =   to give
E[Z1jY;G] = kY  ;
where, re-instating the index i;
 = i1 = pi=(p0 + pi); k = k
i
1 = f
1 i1
i ; t = (
0
t
i
t)
i1(i1; ~
2
0i);
with it := (i; 
2
i ~
2
i ) and 
0
t (i) = (i; ~
2
0): Finally, the cuto¤ for Y
i
u is
given explicitly by Lemma 2 as
iu = (~
i
u=(k
i
1
i
u))
1=i1 :
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1m
This section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 1m; which is like Theorem 1, but
more intricate in its details on account of an application of a result from [15,
Th. 14.2 (Appendix 7)], TheoremM below. Appropriate substitutions (of the
parameter values used here for the parameter values used there) are needed;
justication of these is routine, but cumbersome, so shown as a tabulation
in the arXiv version only; their basis comes from some calculations deferred
to §5.4. In view of similarities, as well as di¤erences of context, between the
present and the source paper, we follow the convention of §5.2 of overbarring
variables cited from [15, Th. 14.2 (Appendix 7)]. This allows Theorem M to
be read as applicable in either of the two contexts according as parameters
are over-barred, or not. We note that  = 1= the  variables of the two
papers are reciprocals, by Prop. 1.
Theorem M (Multi-rm Cut-o¤ Equations, [15, Th. 14.2 (Appen-
dix 7)]). In the setting of this section, after rescaling so that Y it = 1, with
observations Y is of time s > t replaced by their re-scaled versions ~Y
i
s , the si-
multaneous conditional Bayes equations determining the cuto¤s for ~Y is may
be reduced to a non-singular system of linear equations relating the log-cuto¤s
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to the hypothetical cuto¤s gi dened below. Furthermore, the unique solution
for the disclosure cuto¤ ~yi for the observation of ~Y is is given by
log ~yi =
log gi
i i
+
1
0

1
1 1
log g1 +
2
2 2
log g2 + :::+
m
m m
log gm

;
(16)
where
gi = gi(s) = ^L N(~i; ii~0i
q
1  ~2i )L i with ~i = i(s); the N is intensity,
L i = L i(s) = exp

i(m  1) + i(i   1)
2(~p  ~pi)

exp

 mi + i(i   1)
2~p

;
(the amended meanan adjustment coe¢ cient for the cuto¤),
and where:
^LN(; ) denotes the unique solution of the following equation in y :
(1  y) = HLN(y; ); (17)
i = pi=p (the standard regression coe¢ cient),
 i = pi=(p   pi) (removing agent-is contribution from the aggregate preci-
sion),
1   ~2i is the partial covariance of ~wi on the remaining variates ~wj, with
wj(t) := 0 ~W
0
1 t + i ~W
j
1 t:
Proof of Theorem 1m:We proceed stepwise.
1. (Hypothetical cuto¤ dynamics). We consider s; t with  = pub  
t < s < pub+  1:We apply TheoremM above (with t as the ex-ante date and
s the interim date) to an agent i: Theorem M sets the observation cuto¤s for
~Y iu in terms of the cuto¤s y
hyp
i (u) of a correspondingly dened hypothetical
observer, the latter being dened implicitly via equation (17). As in §5.2,
we perform a variational analysis to derive explicitly the cuto¤s z^i(u) of the
corresponding hypothetical observation.
Since Theorem M applies to variables that have been common-sized to
unity at the ex-ante date t, put Gi(u) = z^i(u)=z^i(t); so that Gi(t) = 1 for each
i: Then, corresponding to a common-sized process, there is a hypothetical
process (g-process) with adjusted value Gi(u)L i(u) as at time u; and with
a hypothetical volatility per unit time of
~hyp,i = hyp,i(u) := ii~0i
q
1  ~2i :
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The solitary hypothetical process, observed intermittently by agent i; is now
subjected to the variational analysis of §5.2, as follows.
As in §3, by the Indi¤erence Principle of [15, §15 (Appendix 8)] applied
at time t; the unique cuto¤ value ~yis for ~Y is and the time-s evaluation of
E[Zi1jY1; :::; Ym] are related by
E[Zi1j(8j)NDj(~yjt);Gt] = E[Zi1j(8j 6= i)NDj(~yjt); Ti = ~yit;Gt] = E[Zi1j(8j)[ Tj = ~yj];Gt]
= kim
i
t~y
1
1t :::~y
m
mt ;
for  = i; and i = pi=p as above; here the last regression formula is quoted
from Lemma 2m (cf. [15, §10.3.3 (Appendix 3)].)
Dropping subscripts, as in §5.2, one has by the conditional Bayes formula
(Prop. 1, §2.3) for the hypothetical output valuation:
G(t)L(t) G(s)L(s) = t(s t)
Z
z1G(s)L(s)
Q(E[Zhyp1 jY hyps ;G+t ]  z1jG+t )dz1+o(s t);
where Zhyp1 = Y
hyp
1 ; by denition of the hypothetical agent. Now argue as in
§5.2 with G(t)L(t) in place of ~(t) to deduce the analogue of (15):
  1
t
 d
du
[G(u)L(u)]

u=t
= G(t)L(t)[2(~hyp=2)  1]:
(This uses the fact that the equations connecting the log-cuto¤s and the hy-
pothetical log-cuto¤s have non-singular matrix details in the arXiv version.)
Performing the di¤erentiation, we obtain the following
G0(t)L(t) +G(t)L0(t) =  tG(t)L(t)[2(~hyp=2)  1];
G0(t)
G(t)
+
L0(t)
L(t)
=  t[2(~hyp=2)  1]:
But z^(u) = z^(t)G(u) [and z^0(u) = z^(t)G0(u); so z^0(u)=z^(u) = G0(u)=G(u)], so
z^0(t)
z^(t)
+
L0(t)
L(t)
=  hyp(t) :=  t[2(~hyp=2)  1]:
So for the hypothetical agent i we obtain explicitly that
log (z^i(t)=z^i()) + log (L i(t)=L i()) =  
Z t

ihyp(s)ds;
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by integration from the date  =   up to any time t prior to + (and
re-instating subscripts). Rearranging and using yhypi (u) = z^i(u)L i(u); gives
log yhypi (u) = log y
hyp
i () 
Z t

ihyp(s)ds: (18)
2. (Actual correlated observation dynamics). We apply the formula of
Theorem M to obtain the cuto¤s ~yit for ~Y
i
t : To have common-sizing at time ;
set ^i(t) := ~y
i(u)=~yi() for  =   < t < +: Returning to the corresponding
actual agent i; substitution from (18) into (16) gives
log ^i(t) =
1
i i

log yhypi () 
Z t

ihyp(s)ds

+
1
0

:::+
j
j j

log(yhypj ()) 
Z t

jhyp(s)ds

+ :::

:
We rearrange this to separate out two components displayed below. The rst,
a continuous inter-arrival discountingterm, generalizes the single observer
case, as a regression-weighted average over the hypothetical counterparts:
1
i i
Z t

ihyp(s)ds+
1
0

1
1 1
Z t

1hyp(s)ds+
2
2 2
(:::) + :::

=
1
i i
Z t

ihyp(s)ds+
1
0

1
1 1
Z t

1hyp(s)ds+
2
2 2
Z t

2hyp(s)ds+ :::

=
Z t

i(s)ds:
The second, a shift term, arises from adjustment of the initial mean in the
move from actual to hypothetical agent:
1
1 1
log yhypi () +
1
0

:::+
i
i i
log yhypi () + :::

;
necessarily equivalent (after factoring through by i; since(log yi(u))=i =
log ~yi(u)) to (log yi())=i for yi() the re-initialization value at time : So
1
i
log yi(u) = log ~yi(u) =   1
i i
Z t

ihyp(s)ds
  1
0

1
1 1
Z t

v1hyp(s)ds+
2
2 2
Z t

v2hyp(s)ds+ :::

:
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So
log yit =  
1
 i
Z t

ihyp(s)ds
  1
0

1
i
1
1
 1
Z t

v1hyp(s)ds+ 2
i
2
1
 2
Z t

v2hyp(s)ds+ :::

:
3. (Actual correlated valuation dynamics). From Lemma 2m
~
i
= (i; ~
2
0)(
i
1; ~
2
i ); and ~m =
Y
j
(j; ~
2
0j);
E[Zh1 jYt = yt;Gt] = khm~
h  ~m  y11t :::ymmt ;
using notation established there. Put
~t = y
1
1t :::y
m
mt :
Take logarithms, substitute for i log yit; next relabel j for i in the rst term
and change order of summation in the second, to obtain
log ~t : =  
X
i
i
 i
Z t

ihyp(s)ds+
X
i
X
j
i
0
i
j
j
 j
Z t

vjhyp(s)ds
=  
X
j
j
 j
Z t

jhyp(s)ds+
X
j
X
i
i
0
i
j
j
 j
Z t

vjhyp(s)ds
=  
X
j

1 +
X
i
i
j
i
0

j
 j
Z t

jhyp(s)ds:
So
E[Zi1jYt = yt;Gt] = kim~
i  ~m  ~t  gi[ ]:
5.4 Extending the two lemmas of §5.2
We extend Lemmas 1 and 2 of §5.2 to general m to establish:
~it = E[Zi1jYt = yt;Gt] = kimity11t :::ymmt :
We need some additional notation chosen so as to have the general case
appear typographically similar to the m = 1 case. Treating m-vectors y; z 2
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Rm+ as functions on f1; 2; 3; :::;mg, dene yz (and so y=z) and the exponential
yz in the pointwise sense; also write the product of the components of yz as
hyzi := (y1z1):::(ymzm);
by analogy with inner products, so that
loghyzi := hz; log yi = z1 log y1 + :::+ zm log ym:
In particular, identifying  > 0 with the vector all of whose components are
 (qua function constantly ), hyi = (y1:::ym): Finally, for convenience:
i or im := pi=p (i = 0; 1; :::;m); 
i
1 := pi=(p0+pi) (i = 1; :::;m):
Lemma 1m (Valuation of Z1 given observation Y1 = y). Put  =
(:::; jm; :::): Then
E1[Zi1jY1 = y; ] = kihyi for ki = kim = f ih(1=f)i:
Proof. With the overbar notations as in Lemma 1, note from [15, Prop. 10.3]
that if T has components Ti = X Yi; where X and (::: Yi:::) are independent,
with precision parameters pi, then for i = pi=(p0 + p1 + :::+ pm) and  > 0
E[ Xj T = t] = Kt11 :::tmm = Khti:
As before X and Yi have conditional variances 20t and 
2
it: Take K = 1
(its limiting value as t! 0; see Lemma 1) and note that pi = (1=i)2: For
 = i; conditioning on Y1 = y; read o¤ kim = f
ih(1=f)i from
E[Zi1j T ] = E[f iX1 j T ] = f ih T i = f ih(Y1=f)1=)i = f ih(y=f)i: 
Lemma 2m (Time-t conditional law of the valuation of Z1, given
observation Yt). Conditional on Yt = y; the time-t distribution of the
time-1 valuation E[Zi1jY1;G1] is that of
ki~
i
mhyiZ^it ;
where, as in Lemma 1m and Lemma 2:
(i)  := (1m; :::; 
m
m) ;
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(ii) for  = 1  0 = (p  p0)=p; and i1 = pi=(p0 + pi);
~
i
m :=
~
i
indiv~agg : ~
i
indiv := (i; ~
2
0)(
i
1; ~
2
i );
~agg =
Y
j
(j; ~
2
0j);
(iii) Z^it is log-normal, its underlying mean-zero normal of variance
P
j 
2
j ~
2
0j.
In particular, this time-t distribution has mean given by
E[Zi1jYt = y;Gt] = kim~
i
indiv  ~agghyi:
Proof. From Lemma 1m we have for  = (1m; :::; 
j
m; :::)
E1[Zi1jY1] = E1[f iXi1 jY1] = kimh(Y1)i:
Conditional on Yt = (:::Y
j
t :::); by (13) of Lemma 2, with  := 
j
m for each j;
there is Z^jt = Z^jt(j) of unit mean and variance 2j ~
2
0j; with
Z^jt = exp

j[j0 ~W
0
1 t + j ~W
j
1 t] 
1
2
2j ~
2
0j

;
such that
(Y j1 )
j = j(Y jt )
j Z^jt; where 
j = (0t (j)
j
t)
j(j; 
2
j ~
2
0j);
for jt := (j; 
2
j ~
2
j): So by substitution
E1[Zi1jY1] = kim
Y
j1
j(Y jt )
j Z^jt:
NowY
j1
(0t
j
t)
j(j; 
2
j ~
2
0j) =
Y
j
(j; ~
2
0)
j(j1; ~
2
i )
j(j; 
2
j ~
2
0j)
= (i; ~
2
0)(
i
1; ~
2
i )
Y
j
(j; 
2
j ~
2
0j);
where  :=
P
j1 
j
m :=
P
j1 pj=p = (p  p0)=p = 1  0: Put
Z^it : =
Y
j1
Z^ijt = exp
X
j

j[j0 ~W
0
1 t + j ~W
j
1 t] 
1
2
2j ~
2
0j

= exp
X
j1

jj0 ~W
0
1 t  
1
2
2j
2
j ~
2
0

exp
X
j1

jj ~W
j
1 t  
1
2
2j ~
2
j

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(since ~20j = 
2
j ~
2
0 + ~
2
j). This is a product of independent terms each of unit
expectation. The product has variance
P
j 
2
j [~
2
0 + ~
2
j ] =
P
j 
2
j ~
2
0j:We arrive
at
E[Zi1jYt;Gt] = kimihY t iZ^it : 
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